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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1

Mr. Charles Taylor reportedly sponsored the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) as a
means to destabilize Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone was at the time a rear base for the West
African peacekeeping force that was preventing Taylor from seizing the Liberian capital,
Monrovia2. The Prosecution alleges that Mr. Taylor is, by his acts or omissions,
criminally responsible for planning, ordering and/or instigating numerous unlawful
killings, acts of terrorism, sexual and physical violence, conscripting or recruiting
children less than fifteen years into armed forces or groups, abductions, child labor, and
looting, during the civil war in Sierra Leone.34 Charles Taylor was indicted along with
Foday Sankoh, notorious RUF field commander Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, Koroma, the
Minister of Interior and former head of the Civil Defense Force, Samuel Hinga Norman,
and several others. Sankoh, Bockarie Norman and Koroma have since passed on and
Charles Taylor has been transferred to The Hague5. This memorandum addresses the
scope of the defense of military necessity in international criminal law, in the context of
the Sierra Leone war.
1 The Scope of Military Necessity

2 The Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 Indictment (March 3, 2003) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 14]
3 Id.

4 Human Rights Watch: Third Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.scsl.org/specialcourtannualreport2005-2006.pdf, accessed April 7, 2007 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28]

5 Amnesty Report 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/sle-summary-eng, accessed April 7, 2007
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
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B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The Principle of military necessity acknowledges the potential for unavoidable
civilian death and injury ancillary to the conduct of legitimate military operations.

Article 14 of the Leiber Code 1863 provides that military necessity, as understood by
modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are
indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according to the modern
law and usages of war6. This definition has been carried on to the 21st century to a
definition of military necessity to mean “doing what is necessary to achieve a war aim.7 ”

2. The Law applicable to military necessity includes (1) The Hague Rules of 1907 (2)
Geneva Convention IV 1949 (3) Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention 1977 (4)
Rome Statute (5) International Usage and Custom.

The Hague Rules of 1899 were replaced by the Hague Rules of 1907. The Hague Rules
of 1907 provide for civilian protection. The Geneva Convention IV of 1949 made civilian
protection more comprehensive, while the Additional Protocol of 1977 dealt with more
specific issues like proportionality8. The Rome Statute provides for war crimes which is
relevant to what actions are entirely prohibited and which ones can be justified under
military necessity.

3. The issue is to what extent the accused can justify their actions including
devastating villages, breaking international agreements and targeting diamond
fields under the defense of military necessity.

These issues represent the prosecutor’s side of the story. The information was derived
from (1) The Indictment of Charles Taylor (2) Amnesty Report 2005 and (3) Trying
Charles Taylor in The Hague: Making Justice Accessible to Those Most Affected, A
6 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Leiber Code). 24 April 1863, Article 14[reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

7 Archbold’s International Criminal Courts, page 606, [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39]

8 Jaworski Eric, "Military Necessity" and "Civilian Immunity" Where is the Balance? [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
23]
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paper by Human Rights Watch and by that virtue. We also to anticipate the stories the
defense may turn up with contradicting, affirming or in addition to the currently available
information.

4. Some military actions cannot be justified by invoking military necessity

The devastation of villages, which in the case of Sierra Leone included (1) targeting lives
(2) child soldiers (3) child Labor (4) maiming (5) physical violence (6) terrorism (7)
raping (8) looting cannot be justified by military necessity. Also, perfidy which in the
case of Sierra Leone involved (1) violating the Lome peace agreement and (2) attacking
peacekeeping forces cannot be justified by this argument.

5. There is flexibility regarding some military actions that may cause reasonable
collateral damage to civilian life and private property.

Causing collateral damage to civilian lives and to private property can be justified
where military imperative demands. However, in order for such actions to be justified
under the defense of military necessity, care must be taken to insure that the military
objects targeted make substantial contribution to the military action and military
advantage.

6. Distinct military objectives may be targeted and destroyed.

Article 25 of the Hague Rules provides that only military objects may be targeted. The
Hague rules do not provide a definition of military objects but Article 52 (2) of the
Additional Protocol 1 provides a definition with an open list of examples of civilian
objects which may not be targeted. A military object has to fulfill two criteria. First, the
object has to contribute effectively to the military action of the enemy. Second, its
destruction or neutralization has to offer a definite military advantage for the other side.

8

II. MILITARY NECESSITY
The Principle of military necessity acknowledges the potential for unavoidable civilian
death and injury ancillary to the conduct of legitimate military operations hence the
defense of military necessity.

Military necessity is the principle that some measures are indispensable for
securing the ends of war9. Military necessity justifies a resort to all measures which are
indispensable for securing the object of war10 and which are not forbidden by modern
laws and customs of war. Article 23 of the Hague Rules of 1907 identifies for those
military actions that are completely prohibited and those where International
Humanitarian Law is flexible.
Measures which can be justified by military necessity include the following:
a. all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose
destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of war;
b. the capturing of every armed enemy, and of every enemy of importance to the hostile
government, or of peculiar danger to the captor;
c. the destruction of property, if demanded by the necessities of war;
d. the obstruction of ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication ;
e. the withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy;
f. the appropriation of whatever the enemy's country affords that is necessary for the
subsistence and safety of the army;

9 Sliedregt Van Elies, Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems: Building Bridges, Bridging the Gap, The International Society for
the Reform of Criminal Law, 17th International Conference, (August 25, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

10 FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36], Section II on Conduct of Hostilities,
Military Necessity subsection defines the object of war as to bring about complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by
means of regulated violence
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g. such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith, either positively
pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the
modern law of war to exist;
Measures which cannot be justified by military necessity include the following11:
a. cruelty-that is, the infliction of suffering merely for spite or revenge;
b. maiming or wounding except in combat;
c. torture to extort confessions;
d. the use of poison in any way;
e. wanton devastation of a district;
f. acts of perfidy;
g. the use of poison as not applicable to the use of toxic gases;
In order to decide whether there is Military Necessity, the following test was
developed12:
•

Test 1: Does the measure violate an absolute prohibition contained in IHL

•

Test 2: Is the occupying power facing an actual state of necessity

•

Test 3: Is the measure the most adequate and effective response to the existing threat?
27

•

Test 4: Does military advantage out weigh damage to civilian population?

•

Test 5: Was the measure adopted after due consideration of all the interests involved
and by the proper authority?

11 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of (August 12,1949), and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2][herein after additional protocol 1, Article
51(5), provides for types of attacks that are to be considered as indiscriminate and therefore prohibited

12 The Separation Barrier and International Humanitarian Law, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research,
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25] Extrapolated guidelines for the
proper use of the defense of military necessity and formulated the five step cumulative test.
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The test for deciding whether there is Military Necessity is based on the principle of
proportionality and the principle of distinction. Both depend on the definition of a
military target. Below are definitions of concepts helpful in understanding Military
Necessity:
i. Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is based on two complementary ideas. The first is
that measures have to be taken to limit the harm which efforts to attain military goals will
cause to civilian populations. The second is that the attacking power should make an
audit of its proposed operation, comparing the foreseeable damage to the civilian
population with the expected military advantage13.

With regard to the first, geographically, the military target should be defined in
the narrowest possible way. Similarly, the attacking power should consider whether there
is a way to achieve the military objective with less or no damage to the civilian
population. Here proportionality constitutes a logical extension of the principle of
distinction: everything should be done to target only military objectives.

Regarding ordering the attacking power to make an audit of its proposed
operation and weigh the options, weighing the options requires the army to relinquish a
military advantage if its attainment threatens to cause disproportionate harm to the
civilian population. In other words, damage to the civilian population becomes prohibited
once it is seen to be excessive in relation to the military advantage.
13 Ami chai Cohen, Proportionality in the Modern Law of War: An Unenforceable Norm, or the Answer to our Dilemma? The Begin
Sadat Center for strategic studies [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37]
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In the Sierra Leone scenario, the accused were obliged to adhere to the principle
of proportionality. They were expected to have weighed the goal of the war against its
effects to the civilians. They were also obliged to have taken measures to limit the
collateral damage to the civilian population. The facts do not seem to disclose any efforts
to limit collateral damage to the civilian population.

ii. Distinction
The Principle of distinction dictates that “distinction must be made at all times
between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to
the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.”14 In other words, attacks that are
directed at both civilian and military objects are illegal. Attacking powers have to satisfy
themselves through their intelligence or otherwise, which objects they are going to attack.
The objective of distinction is to avoid civilian targets or to attack a military target that is
proximate with a civilian object only after weighing the contribution to the enemy action
and to the advantage earned by the other party to the attack.15.
From the facts of the Sierra Leone case, it is not clear that the warring groups had
any other target other than the civilian population when they attacked the villages. They
actually targeted civilian populations. This violates the principle of distinction.
iii. Military Target and Military Object or Military objective

14 Henckaerts Jean-Marie, International Humanitarian Law, Volume II, part 1: The Principle of Distinction under part III of the
Principle of Distinction, Practices of International Organizations and Conferences, United Nations, Section 55. The Principle of
Distinction by Jean-Marie Henckaerts, lists over 60 International and National legal provisions to the effect that the principle of
Distinction is the most central principle of the law of warfare. [reproduced in accompanying notebook Tab 35

15 Additional Protocol I, Article 52 (2)

12

Military objects must be tangible things. They may be people or objects. People
who may be targeted include combatants, police officers if they are incorporated into
the army, and civilians and police officer who unlawfully take part in the hostilities16.
An object must cumulatively fulfill two criteria to be a military objective:
1) The object has to contribute effectively to the military action of the enemy. This is
exemplified by an object’s nature, location, purpose or use, which clarifies that not
only objects of a military nature are military objectives.
2) Its destruction, capture, or neutralization has to offer a definite military advantage
for the other side. For avoidance of doubt, dams, dikes, and hospitals, may not be
used by those who control them for military action and should therefore never
become military objectives. If they are however used for military purposes, even
they can under restricted circumstances become military objectives.

III. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
The issue is whether Mr. Taylor, the warring groups and their commanders can justify
devastating villages, breaking international agreements, and targeting diamond fields
under the defense of military necessity.

In March 1991, civil war erupted in Sierra Leone when soldiers of the
Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) invaded from Liberia, and began battling the Sierra
Leone Army (“SLA”).17 Conflict between these two factions and their respective allies
continued until July 1999, when the two sides signed the Lome Peace Agreement. Article
16 of the Lome Peace Agreement called for the establishment of a “neutral peacekeeping
force” sponsored by the UN, and was consented to by the leadership of the Government
16 Id

17 Amnesty Report 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/sle-summary-eng accessed on March 5, 2007 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
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of Sierra Leone and the RUF. The RUF attacked the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone (“UNAMSIL”) after signing the Lome Agreement.18
Charles Taylor reportedly sponsored the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) as a
means to destabilize Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone then was a rear base for the West African
peacekeeping force ECOMOG, which was preventing Taylor from seizing the Liberian
capital, Monrovia19. Taylor reportedly helped broker a deal with the government in
Burkina Faso on behalf of the RUF for the supply of Burkinabe mercenaries, with
payment to be made in Sierra Leone diamonds. The RUF, and allegedly other groups
sympathetic to the Government of Sierra Leone, attacked small villages and killed
civilians, mutilated people, raped women, recruited child soldiers below the age of 15 and
looted people’s property. In July 1999 the RUF and the government entered into an
agreement to end the war, but the RUF resumed fighting and took UN forces hostage in
violation of the Peace Agreement they were party to. The RUF was subsequently
defeated. A special Court the Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) was set up to
inquire into the crimes committed in the period of the war. Following is the status of the
cases presented to this court.
First, three alleged leaders of the former Civil Defense Forces were indicted on
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. 20 Testimony in the Civil Defense Forces’ case began in January 2006

18 Amnesty Report 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/sle-summary-eng accessed on March 5, 2007 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

19 Id.

20 The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Case brief, http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF.html accessed April, 8, 2007
[[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17]
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and ended in the month of October 2006. 21 Final arguments from the parties were heard
in November 2006. 22 Secondly, five alleged leaders of the former Revolutionary United
Front were indicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations
of international humanitarian law23. The RUF trial began in July 2004. The Prosecution
concluded its case in August 200624. The RUF Defense case is scheduled to open in May
of 200725. Final arguments in the case of the former Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council took place in the month of December 200626. Finally, Charles Taylor was
indicted along with Foday Sankoh, notorious RUF field commander Sam "Mosquito"
Bockarie, Koroma, the Minister of Interior and former head of the Civil Defense Force,
Samuel Hinga Norman, and several others. 27 Sankoh, Bockarie and Koroma have since
passed on. 28 Mr. Taylor was formally charged with 1) crimes against humanity, 2) war

21 The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Case brief, http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF.html accessed April, 8, 2007
[[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17]

22 Id.

23 Case Brief, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http:/www.sc-sl.org/RUF.html, accessed on April 8, 2007 [[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20]

24 Case Brief, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http:/www.sc-sl.org/RUF.html, accessed on April 8, 2007 [[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20]

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 The Prosecutor vCharles Taylor, Case brief, http://www.sc-sl.org/AFR.html accessed April, 8, 2007 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 20]

28 Amnesty Report 2005, Africa, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/sle-summary-eng, accessed April 7, 2007 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
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crimes and 3) other serious violations of international humanitarian law contrary to
Articles 2, 3 and 4 respectively of the Statute of the Special Court.29
IV. Historical Development of Military Necessity
The Law applicable to Military Necessity is the (1) The Hague Rules of 1907, (2) Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Convention 1949 (3) Rome Statute 1977 (4) International Usage and
Custom.

The law of war has evolved from a time where there was no distinction between
military and civilian targets to a time where attacking powers have to respect civilians. 30
The post World War II period attempted to do away with respect for civilians by
broadening the concept of Military Necessity but the current modern law of war restored
the principle of civilian immunity as part of the law governing military engagement.31
This section discusses the state of civilian protection from the Middle Ages, through the
post World War era up to the end of the 20th Century.
During the Middle Ages, belligerents were free, according to ethics as well as
law, to kill all enemies whether or not they were members of the armed force.32 In those
days, there was no difference between the army and the civilian. A famous example is
when troops under the command of a Roman general called one Scipio Aemilianus
29 The Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 Indictment (March 3, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 14]

30 Jaworski Eric, "Military Necessity" and "Civilian Immunity" Where is the Balance? [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23]

31 Id.

32 Id.

32 Sliedregt Van Elies, Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems: Building Bridges, Bridging the Gap, The International Society for
the Reform of Criminal Law, 17th International Conference, (August 25, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
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annihilated the people of the City of Carthage in March of 146 B.C..33 The annihilation of
Carthage was the result of years of bitter struggle between Carthage and Rome.34 Since
then nations have striven throughout modern history to make sure war is waged in a way
that reduces unnecessary suffering, especially that of civilian populations35.
One of the earlier efforts to regulate damage to civilian populations is the Leiber
Code of 168336. The Leiber Code codified the rules that military commanders must now
pursue, requiring them to 1) achieve military superiority at a minimum cost, and 2)
minimize civilian casualties.37 Hence it has become necessary for international law to
develop a corollary that could be used to help make sense of these contradictory
objectives thus balancing function between military and humanitarian requirements.38
Article 68 of Lieber's instructions states that unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life
is not lawful.
During the era of World War I and II, Lieber’s concept of military necessity was
developed into a theory of Kriegsraison in the twentieth century by the German army who

used it to justify many violations of laws and customs of war.39 The defense of military
33 aworski Eric, "Military Necessity" and "Civilian Immunity" Where is the Balance? [reproduced in accompanying notebook at

J

Tab 23]

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Id.
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necessity was extensively considered and allowed under certain conditions, in the postSecond World War cases of Hostages and High Command.40 In the former case, the
Tribunal stipulated that Article 23(g) of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare prohibited ‘the
destruction or seizure of enemy property except in cases where this destruction or seizure
is urgently required by the necessities of war’. In the latter case, the U.S. Tribunal
allowed a plea of military necessity.41 However, the defense of military necessity was
more often rejected than accepted and the Hostages and High Command cases qualify as
exceptions rather than rules.42
The current modern law of war owes its current state to the Hague Rules of 1907,
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 194943 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.44 The
current modern law of war also includes customary norms, derived from the general
practice of a majority of states over time. Section II, Hostilities, Chapter I, Hague Rules
1907 talks about means of Injuring the enemy, sieges, and bombardments. Article23Article 28 of the Hague Rules require attacking forces to respect civilian immunity and if
there is military necessity to apply the principles of distinction and proportionality.
40 Sliedregt Van Elies, Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems: Building Bridges, Bridging the Gap, The International Society for
the Reform of Criminal Law, 17th International Conference, (August 25, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

41 Id..

42 Id..

43 Cavaleri David., The Law of War: Can 20th Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? ?[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 37]

44 Jaworski Eric, "Military Necessity" and "Civilian Immunity" Where is the Balance?
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
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Before we proceed to apply the 5 step test for military necessity, following is an
elaboration of the 5 step test, hereinafter the Harvard Test, to ensure the proper use of
military necessity in the Sierra Leone case:
1). Does the measure violate an absolute prohibition: Since military necessity is a
legal exception to a legal prohibition, the exception must be stated in the law? Thus
Military Necessity can never justify actions that are prohibited by the law.
2) .Is the occupying power facing a state of necessity? When the exception is
provided for, usually, the law will say appropriation of civilian property is prohibited
unless required by absolute military necessity.
3). Is the measure the most adequate to the existing necessity? This is a decision
that is made before targeting a military target that may result in civilian collateral
damage
4). Does military advantage outweigh the damage done to the population? This is a
question that like step (3) relates to proportionality and distinction.
5). Was the measure taken after due consideration by the rightful authority?
V Legal Discussion
We shall apply the Harvard test to the three issues identified in the summary of
findings as follows: 1) the devastation of villages 2) breaking international agreements
and 3) appropriating property

19

1. Violating Peace Agreements

Test 1: Does the measure violate an absolute prohibition contained in IHL?
Violating Peace Agreements including violating the Lome peace agreement and
taking UN keeping forces Hostage cannot be justified by invoking military
necessity

Perfidy is prohibited under International Law. Article 23(g) prohibits the making
of improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and
uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.
Perfidy is also prohibited under the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions 1949 Protocol I. The breaking of international and cease fire agreements and
fooling civilians to go into a fire zone is all prohibited under breaking faith and perfidy.
Tests 2, 3 , 4 and 5 become inapplicable when the act is an absolute prohibition
under IHL. We shall now move on to the next act of the accused and apply the Tests until
they become inapplicable.

2. Devastation of Villages

Test 1: Does the measure violate an absolute prohibition contained in IHL?
(i) The devastation of villages cannot be justified by invoking military necessity.

Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I provides that civilians can never be a
military target. Crimes such as sexual violence, 45 recruiting child soldiers, 46 child labor,
looting and terrorism47 do not therefore move beyond the first step in the cumulative test.

45 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6], Article 8 (2) (b)
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions

46 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6] Article 8 (2) (b)
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate
actively in hostilities

47Id. Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated
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In The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic Tihofil and others48, the armed forces of the Croatian
Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna attacked Muslim civilian
populations in the towns, villages and hamlets. The defense of military necessity was
considered by the ICTY but was not accepted because the defense of military necessity
cannot be used to justify an attack on civilian populations.

On the Appeal the appellant argued that the villages in question were not civilians
but military targets49 because there were members of military groups in the villages. His
argument was that the crime needed to be looked at broadly, not as isolated incidents.
According to his evidence, the alleged Muslim civilian populations had many members
of the fighting groups among them. The presence of members of the army, he argued
stripped the civilian groups of the privileges of a civilian population. His defense was
accepted on the grounds that although mere presence of the militia does not strip a
community of the status of a civilian population, but rather the number of members of the
militia and whether or not the members of military groups are on leave is relevant in
deciding whether a civilian population is a valid military target under international law or
not.

Also in Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Naletilic and Martinovic identified
persons of Muslim ethnic background. They arrested them, evicted them, plundered their

48 The Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. (IT-95-14/2) "Lasva Valley" (Appeals Chamber), (December 17, 2004)
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13]

49 The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14/1 (Trial Chamber), (March 3, 2000) [ reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
12]
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homes and forcibly transferred them to detention centers, or across the confrontation lines.
They also used them as human shields.

The RUF invaded villages where there was no armed military target. They
maimed civilians, raped women, recruited child soldiers and looted property. This
seems to have been more of a contemplated military strategy or a part of a military
approach. It does not seem to have been a justifiable military choice requiring the
armed group to do an evil act that violates the spirit of International Humanitarian Law.
The facts do not disclose the existence of any Military target in the vicinity of the
civilian population. The act of devastating villages does not fall under the defense of
Military Necessity because it is in the first instance, prohibited by International
Humanitarian Law including The Hague Rules 1907, the ICC statute and the ICTY
statute.
Although breaking agreements such as the RUF breaking the Lome agreement
falls under perfidy, this issue also does not proceed to the next stage of analysis because
it is prohibited by International Law. For the rest of the steps, we shall now move on to
consider situations under which military necessity may be justified.

Test 2: Is the occupying power facing an actual state of necessity?
ii. However, there is flexibility regarding some military actions that may cause
reasonable collateral damage to civilian life and property.

Rome Statute Article 8 2 b (xiii) prohibits destroying or seizing the enemy's
property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war. The same prohibition appears in Hague Rules Article 23(g). Jennifer Van Bergen
& Charles B. Gittings, in their paper, “Bush War: Military Necessity or War Crimes?”
Gave an example of military necessity which I think fits with our current discussion.
22

They said that when the United States (“US”) launched their D-Day invasion, they knew
that there were French civilians living in the beachhead area, that would very likely be
injured or killed, but they also knew that warning the French civilians of the invasion
would seriously jeopardize the chance of its success.
In the above example it is clear that killing French civilians was not the object of
the attack. The French civilians just happened to be there. This is quite different from the
Sierra Leone scenario, where the civilian villages seem to have been the target. They
seem to have been the targets because after the attack, the army mutilated the survivors,
raped women, recruited some of the children into the army and also looted property.
In order to succeed under the defense of military necessity, there must be a military
object whose targeting results in reasonable collateral civilian casualties.

Test 3: Is the measure the most adequate and effective response to the existing threat?
The total of the law of warfare including Article 46 of The Hague Regulations and
Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol 1 is such that civilians cannot be valid military
targets, and that family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as
well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. It is not called for to
consider the adequacy of a response that requires targeting civilians. Assuming that the
civilian population was living together with members of military groups, the measure of
proportionality differs from case to case. The Strugar Trial Judgment cited in Galic Trial
Judgment in the holding50 says that the principle of military necessity requires that
destroying particular military targets will provide some type of advantage in weakening

50 Schabas William, The United Nations International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone
[reproduced in accompanying notebook Tab 21]
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the enemy military forces. The holding goes on to say that whether a military advantage
can be achieved must be decided from the perspective of the person contemplating the
attack, including the information available to the latter, that the object is being used to
make an offensive contribution to military action.51
Test 4: Does military advantage out weigh damage to civilian population?
The Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949 Article 52(2) provides
that attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military of advantage. Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol 1provides that all
other objects that are not included in 52(2) of Additional Protocol 1 are civilian objects
and must not form the object of the attack.

The Rome Statute includes in its list of other serious violations of the laws and
customs of war, actions like attacking civilians, civilian objects and launching an attack
on military objects with the knowledge that that such attack will cause excessive
collateral damage to civilians and or to the environment in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated.

In the Saddam Hussein Trial, residents of the Dujail community were put under
military siege because of fire arms that were shot at Sadam Hussein’s motorcade when he
was going through their town. Sadam Hussein, in his defense said that he bulldozed the
51Id.
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overlapping orchards and enlarged the road because he wanted the community to enjoy
more security.

However the Court did not consider that defense as there was

incriminating evidence from Sadam’s testimony that he bulldozed the orchards to punish
the Dujail residents for shooting at him. Although the Court did not use the word
proportionate in their Judgment, there was mention of the number of gun shots that were
shot at the motorcade and the resultant measures on the community. The other measures
included kicking and torture to extract information, helicopter bombing and executions.

The Saddam Hussein scenario is similar to the one of Sierra Leone. The accused
in the case of Sierra Leone, especially Mr. Taylor, got involved in the Sierra Leone
because Sierra Leone was acting as a base for the Western African peace keeping forces
that were preventing him from taking the City of Liberia, Monrovia. The damage caused
by raiding of villages in Sierra Leone to prevent the Western African Peace keeping
forces from blocking his bid for power in Liberia is not proportionate to the direct
military success over the armed enemies.
Test 5: Was the measure adopted after due consideration of all the interests involved and
by the proper authority?
In the preceding discussion we said that under Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol 1 military objectives are defined as objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers definite military advantage. This definition of military object, we said, requires
military planners to (1) evaluate the contribution that an object will make to military
actions and (2) assess military advantage to be gained by its neutralization.
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In the case of Saddam Hussein, also just discussed in the preceding paragraph,
The IHT found Saddam Hussein liable even though when he learnt about the air
bombings of the people of Dujail, he ordered for the investigation and punishment of the
culprits. In the current scenario, it would seem that the absence of direct control of the
fighting forces regarding raping, looting of civilian property, may serve to deny the other
commanders the defense of military necessity because the decisions will have lacked
careful consideration during planning, what object to hit and what options to consider in
order to avoid unnecessary collateral civilian casualties.
We shall now turn to the last issue and apply the Harvard Test.

3. Diamond Fields and Looting

Test 1: Does the measure violate an absolute prohibition contained in IHL?
Appropriating private property (looting) and quasi public property (diamond mines)
can be justified if imperative necessity requires.

Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations provides that in addition to the
prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden, among other
prohibitions, to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Also Article 53 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention provides that any destruction by the occupying power of real or
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State,
or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited,
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
Under the Convention, military objects may be targeted.
We have already seen that military objects are objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and whose total
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or partial destruction, capture or neutralization lead to an effective contribution to
military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers definite military advantage. Article 52(2) of the
Optional Protocol I provides that in case of doubt as to whether an object is being used
for civilian purposes or not, then it is being used for civilian purposes and is not a
military objective.
In the Kosovo air campaign, NATO listed government ministries among the
legitimate military objectives, independently of their contribution to military
action.52Another case is where in the case of dual use objects like bridges as was the case
when NATO bombed bridges that are obviously used by both civilians and the military53.
In Kupreskic, Court decided that even if the individual raids are not prohibited, their
accumulative effect will be taken into considered if the pattern of attacks may turn out to
jeopardize excessively civilian lives and property.
In the current case, the property looted would fall under the Kupreskic scenario
with regard to civilian property. The diamond mines would be covered under the NATO
cases. It would seem that the looting of civilian property may not be justified under the
defense of military necessity. The fight for diamond fields by the warring factions would
be justified under Military Necessity as in the NATO case and the bridge and radio
stations they targeted during the air raids.
Test 2: Is the occupying power facing an actual state of necessity
52 Sassoli Marco, Legitimate Targets, of attack under International Humanitarian Law, Background Paper, Harvard Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22] page 606

53 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal
Republic Of Yugoslavia, June 13, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1272, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm accessed April 23,
2007 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31]

27

According to Article 23 of the Hague Rules of 1907, to destroy or seize the
enemy's property is prohibited, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. There must be imperative necessity to appropriate
private property. We can adopt as our example the French civilians54. The above example
dealt with people’s lives, which in International Humanitarian Law are protected much
more than property. The example is applicable to the looting of civilian property.
The definition of necessity with regard to destroying or appropriating public
property is still vague as seen from the Kosovo air campaigns of the Radio and TV
stations by NATO.
Test 3: Is the measure the most adequate and effective response to the existing threat?
In the discussions under devastating villages, we said that the definition of
military object in Article 52(2) of Optional Protocol I provides that attacks shall be
limited strictly to military objectives which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military of
advantage.55 In practice, whether a military advantage can be achieved from hitting a
military object must be decided from the perspective of the person contemplating the
attack, including the information available to the latter, that the object is being used to

54 Bergen Jennifer et al, Bush War: Military Necessity or War Crimes? TruthOut.org. (July 14, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26]
55 Sassoli Marco, Legitimate Targets, of attack under International Humanitarian Law, Background Paper, Harvard Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22] page 606
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make an offensive contribution to military action56. This is a subjective decision that will
depend on the person that is making the decision and the circumstances of each case.
Test 4: Does military advantage out weigh damage to civilian population?
The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 Article 52(2)
provides that attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. And Article 52(1) of
the Optional Protocol I requires military planners to (1) evaluate the objects contribution
to the military actions and (2) to assess military advantage to be gained, and that Article
52(3) Additional Protocol I provides that in cases of doubt, “the object shall be presumed
not to be used for civilian purposes.” And also that the Rome Statute also includes in its
list of other serious violations of the laws and customs of war actions including attacking
civilians, civilian objects and launching an attack on military objects with the knowledge
that that such attack will cause excessive collateral damage to civilians and or to the
environment in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
The concept of weighing the contribution to the advantage was considered in the Saddam
Hussein trial on facts similar to the Sierra Leone case.

In the Saddam Hussein trial, Court did not use the word proportionate in their
Judgment, but seemed to have found the measures taken by Sadam to be disproportionate
to the military advantage. The measures included kicking and torture to extract
information, helicopter bombing and executions. The Sadam Hussein scenario is similar
to the one of Sierra Leone with regard to the looting of civilian property. There must be
proportionality even when the law is flexible. With regard to public property including

56 Id.
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the diamond mines, the NATO case is more relevant. Military groups are still in the
driving seat with regard to what public property may be bombed or not but they have to
remember that there must be a weighing of factors to determine that military objectives
they choose are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
of advantage in accordance with Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol.

Test 5: Was the measure adopted after due consideration of all the interests involved and
by the proper authority?
According to the definition of a military objective in Article 52(2) of Optional
Protocol I military planners are obligate to evaluate (1) the contribution that an object
will make and (2) assessing military advantage to be gained. In the case of Sadam
Hussein, also just discussed in the preceding paragraph, the orchards did not seem to have
had substantial military contribution and yet the orchards according to Saddam Hussein’s
defense the orchards were harboring guns and training centers for a defunct military
group.
VI. CONCLUSION
During war, only military targets can be targeted. Military necessity comes into
play when only targeting a legitimate military target, may involve collateral damage to
civilians. In deciding whether the warring groups can avail themselves the defense of
military necessity, whether the principles of Proportionality and Distinction were
adhered to is relevant. In other words when deciding to hit a military target or object,
warring groups have to be sure that what they are hitting is a military target and if the
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military target and the civilian object are too proximate in location, the principle of
proportionality comes into play. The group has to be sure that the advantages of hitting
the military target outweigh the collateral damage on civilians. The burden is on the
warring group to prove that the decision to attack a military target was arrived at after
adhering to the principles of proportionality and distinction, and that the military
benefit outweighed the civilian suffering.
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